This study examined the roles of verbal and nonverbal sources of information in the ability of persons with and without autism to recognize emotion. Child, adolescent, and young adult participants in four groups [Lower Functioning Autism (LFA) (n = 17), High Functioning Autism (HFA) (n = 18), Lower Functioning Comparison (LFC) (n = 18), and High Functioning Comparison (HFC) (n = 23)] identified emotions shown (happy, angry, sad, surprised, or neutral) in video clips of individuals expressing emotion verbally, nonverbally, or both. Verbal expressions of emotion were either Explicit, Implicit, or Neutral, whereas nonverbal expressions were Animate or Flat (3 × 2). Pairwise ANCOVAs indicated no group differences between HFA and HFC groups or between the LFA and LFC groups, and indicated instead group differences between higher and lower functioning persons. With groups collapsed into High Functioning (HF) and Lower Functioning (LF), significant group differences were found. Performance of LF individuals suggested they had difficulty inferring how a person felt based on what the person said, if the emotion was not explicitly named. Performance of HF individuals suggested they relied more on nonverbal than on verbal information to determine a speaker's emotion, except where the emotion was explicitly named. Results suggested that persons with autistic spectrum disorders can use affective information from multiple sources in much the same ways as persons of comparable developmental level without autism.
clinical features of the social deficit of au-judgments of the conversational partner's emotional reactions, intentions, motives, level tism (Kanner, 1943) . Unusual or inappropriate emotional reactions are frequently observed in of interest, etc. In real situations, however, information available from multiple channels people with autism, as are apparent failures to react appropriately to the emotions of others. often conflicts. For example, an angry but highly controlled person may speak in an Although many studies have found evidence supporting the presence of a specific affective even tone of voice and display a neutral facial expression while conveying an angry mesdeficit in autism, others have not. For example, several studies found that persons with sage. This raises the question of how observers weight or select information from multiple autism were not deficient on emotion tasks when compared to nonautistic persons matched sources when they conflict.
Numerous studies have sought to disentanto them on verbal level (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990 ; Prior, Dahlstrom, & gle the contributions of visual and auditory information to social judgments made under Squires, 1990; Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989) . Other studies have various conditions (Noller, 1985) . Studies of observers' preferences for using visual or aufound that persons with autism may understand certain kinds of emotions (such as those ditory, verbal or nonverbal information to identify emotion suggest that the degree and caused by desires) as well as other people, but are deficient in understanding emotions such direction of preference for facial expression over other channels of information depends as surprise, which may be caused by thoughts or beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1991) . In general, on the type of stimuli used (e.g., video, still pictures), the age and gender of the viewer, recent research has tended to show that deficits in understanding others' internal states are and the choice of emotions being judged (Noller, 1985) . Skilled observers learn to adpresent in autism, but that the nature, extent, and specificity of the deficits found depend in just their weighting of these sources of information according to many variables. The perpart on factors such as the IQ and language level of the persons with autism, the type of son with autism, however, may not have the same facility as others in picking up, weightcomparison group, and the specific states examined.
ing, and interpreting social information from multiple sources at once. Indeed, studies of Although differences in autistic persons' social behaviors may in part be related to a persons with autism indicate that many of them are deficient at cross-modal matching of failure to understand the emotional state expressed by another person (Fein, Lucci, Brav-emotion, relative to matched controls, sug- gesting that dealing with emotional informaerman, & Waterhouse, 1992; Hauck, Fein, Waterhouse, & Feinstein, 1995; Hobson, 1993 ; tion from multiple channels may be difficult for them (Hobson, 1986a (Hobson, , 1986b (Hobson, , 1987 HobKanner, 1943) , they may also be part of a larger problem in detecting and using infor-son, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Loveland, Tu- nali-Kotoski, Chen, Brelsford, Ortegon, & mation about other persons from multiple channels in social situations. Real social situa-Pearson, 1995).
Studies of cross-modal matching of emotions, unlike the stimuli used in many experiments on emotion recognition, involve multi-tion further imply that persons with autism do not necessarily use information about affect ple simultaneous and dynamic channels of information about emotion. The visual chan-from multiple channels in an integrated way as do persons without autism. If so, this difnel offers nonverbal information from facial expressions, gesture, and bodily posture, ference could have important implications for the way persons with autism interpret social while the auditory channel offers verbal/semantic information from a speaker's utter-and communicative situations. One possibility is that they may attend to or prefer to use difances and nonverbal (metalinguistic) information from vocal tone. In conversation, we ferent sources of information than do other people when perceiving a social interaction or ordinarily pick up information from all these sources at once, leading to complex, intuitive a social partner. For example, studies of emo-tion recognition have usually been interpreted violated by the surprising event; thus, recognizing surprise in someone else would to show that persons with autism are deficient in perceiving facial expressions and ges-require understanding that person's belief. Baron-Cohen, Spitz, and Cross (1993) found tures-a nonverbal skill. If so, this would imply that in social situations, persons with au-that participants with autism were selectively impaired in recognizing the more "cognitive" tism pick up less information from facial expressions, and perhaps other nonverbal dis-emotion of surprise, relative to happy and sad. Capps, Yirmiya, and Sigman (1992) found plays, than do other people. It has been suggested that persons with autism can some-that on emotion recognition and expression tasks, participants with High Functioning Autimes compensate for a lack of intuitive (nonverbal) recognition of emotions by ver-tism (HFA) had greater difficulty with the "complex emotions" of pride and embarrassbally reasoning about situations (e.g., MacDonald, Rutter, Howlin, Rios, Le Couteur, ment, which seem to involve awareness of others' thoughts or opinions. These results Evered, & Folstein, 1989; Sigman, 1994) . If so, in conversational interactions persons with suggest that the possibility of differential difficulty in recognizing "cognitive emotions" autism might be able to identify a speaker's emotions if they are explicitly stated ("I'm versus other emotions should be considered in examining the relative success of participants really angry at you") or implied ("You cheated!") but might be less able to do so by with and without autism on emotion recognition tasks. use of nonverbal cues such as facial expression or vocal tone. An affective impairment
The present study was undertaken to examine the above issues, with reference to Lower such as this would result in differential performance in emotion recognition tasks where Functioning (LFA) and HFA groups of children, adolescents, and young adults with auemotion was conveyed to differing extents through verbal and nonverbal channels. In ad-tism and comparison groups similar to them on verbal and nonverbal mental age (Lower dition, because some high-functioning persons with autism have been found to do well Functioning Comparison [LFC], High Functioning Comparison [HFC]). A series of brief on emotion recognition tasks, the developmental level of persons with autism might be video clips of individuals talking and displaying emotion were presented to participants, expected to affect their ability to make use of verbal and nonverbal sources of information and they were asked to identify the emotion shown (happy, angry, sad, surprised, or neuabout emotion.
The picture is further complicated if there tral). In a 3 × 2 design, the video clips were designed to vary according to the amount of are autism-related differences in the relative difficulty of perceiving various emotions. information for emotion present in the verbal and nonverbal channels. Verbal expressions Baron-Cohen (1991) argued that emotions caused by beliefs, such as surprise or embar-of emotion were either Explicit, Implicit, or Neutral, whereas nonverbal expressions of rassment, should be the most difficult for persons with autism to recognize, because of emotion were either Animate or Flat, resulting in six stimulus conditions (see Table 1 ). their well-documented difficulty in understanding others' beliefs (theory of mind).
We hypothesized that (a) across stimulus conditions, participants with LFA or HFA Baron-Cohen and others have hypothesized that social failures in autism are related to a would correctly identify the target emotion less often than would participants of comparacognitive developmental deficit in Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985 ; ble developmental level without an autistic disorder (HFC or LFC); (b) relative to com- Baron-Cohen, 1995) . Some recent research supports the idea that emotions involving as-parison participants, those with LFA or HFA would correctly identify the target emotion sumptions about others' beliefs or attitudes may be harder for persons with autism to un-less often when the available information for affect is from nonverbal sources alone (Neuderstand. For example, surprise seems to entail having a prior belief, which is then tral-Animate condition); and (c) relative to comparison participants, those with LFA or Pervasive Developmental Disorder by DSM-III-R or DSM-IV criteria. All but two cur-HFA would have more difficulty identifying a verbally expressed target emotion when it is rently met DSM-IV criteria for Autistic Disorder (higher or lower functioning); the other implied (Implicit conditions) rather than explicitly named (Explicit conditions). In addi-two had a history consistent with autism but currently met DSM-IV criteria for Pervasive tion, our design permitted us to examine whether there were group differences in the Developmental Disorder-NOS.
Participants in the HFA group had verbal relative difficulty of recognizing surprise-a "cognitive emotion." mental ages of 5 years or greater, and also had Performance IQ, Verbal IQ, or both within normal limits (≥70) (four individuals did not Methods have verbal IQ data available, and their verbal Participants IQs were estimated from the ratio of VMA to CA × 100). All but two had both IQ scores Participants were four groups of children, adolescents, and young adults: LFA (n = 17; 2 within normal limits.
Participants in the LFA group were of female, 15 male), LFC (n = 18; 14 female, 4 male), HFA (n = 18; 2 female, 16 male), and lower mental age, overall, than those in the HFA group (see Table 2 ). Most had both Ver-HFC (n = 23; 10 female, 13 male). They were recruited from a data base of participants in bal and Performance IQs below 75, although several had PIQ within normal limits. As a previous studies, from outpatient child psychiatry clinics, from word-of-mouth referrals, whole, the LFA group was at a markedly lower level of verbal development than the and through cooperating parent organizations. Ethnic distribution for the overall sample was HFA group (Table 2) and was also more socially impaired than the HFA group according 88% Caucasian, 8% African American, 2% Hispanic, and 2% other. All participants were to clinician judgments and parent report information. at least 4 1 ⁄2 years old and had a verbal mental age (VMA) of 36 months or greater. Mean Participants in the LFC group had a previous diagnosis of mental retardation, which chronological age (CA), verbal mental age, nonverbal mental age (NVMA), and perfor-was confirmed with current testing. Anyone with a history of autism or autisticlike behavmance (nonverbal) IQ of the participants in each group are given in Table 2. iors was excluded from this group. Of the 18 LFC participants, 15 had Down syndrome and Participants in the LFA and HFA groups had a preexisting diagnosis of either autism or 3 had MR of unknown etiology. HFC participants were recruited from VMA was obtained from combining age equivalent scores from the Peabody Picture schools and word-of-mouth referrals. All had VMA of 5 years or greater and none had VIQ Vocabulary Test-Revised (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) and the McCarthy Scales of Children's or PIQ below normal limits. Because some participants in the HFA group had verbal or Abilities-Verbal Scale (McCarthy, 1972) , or in the case of older and more able particinonverbal IQ below 85, and because persons with HFA or PDD-NOS often have learning pants, from age equivalents derived from the WISC-III or WAIS-R. Each person who met or attention problems, we included in the HFC group some persons with learning prob-study criteria to participate was scheduled for a second appointment to take part in the exlems, but without autism. Six of 23 were previously identified as having a learning disabil-perimental tasks. ity (n = 3) or an attention deficit disorder (n = 3).
Experimental procedures. In preparation for data collection, a VCR with 25-in. monitor No participants in the four study groups had current evidence of a significant comor-was placed in front of a two-way mirror. The participant was seated about 5 feet from the bid psychiatric disorder (e.g., depression) on screening.
monitor, facing the mirror, behind which a video camera was positioned for videotaping. The examiner sat to the participant's right.
Procedures
Moveable gray curtains were drawn on either side of the monitor and chairs in order to deAssessment procedures. At a first visit, each participant received psychometric assessment, crease distractions and help participants focus on the video display. and parent report, developmental history, and clinician ratings. NVMA and Performance IQ On each of 24 trials, participants saw a brief video clip of a person speaking. Prior to were obtained from testing with the Leiter International Performance Scale (Leiter, 1948) . being shown the video clips, the participants were told that the people in the videos would the verbal message, with the Explicit condition assumed to carry greater information for be feeling angry, happy, sad, surprised, or "just ok." They were also shown a board with affect than the Implicit. The Explicit/Flat and Neutral/Animate conditions each contained cartoon faces labeled with the names of five emotions. After each clip, participants were information from one source only, differing in whether the available information was verbal asked to tell how the person in the videotape was feeling ("How does s/he feel?"), and after (Explicit/Flat) or nonverbal (Neutral/Animate); because of the reduced information in these answering, they were asked to point to the correct emotion on the board with the cartoon conditions relative to the Explicit/Animate and Implicit/Animate conditions, they were faces ("Now show me how s/he feels"). Because there were very few discrepancies be-expected to be more difficult. The Implicit/ Flat condition had no information for affect tween the oral and pointing responses (6.4%), even among participants who could not read, from the nonverbal source and reduced information from the verbal source; therefore it only oral responses are reported here.
Each of the 24 videotaped test stimuli was was expected to be still more difficult to identify the target emotion under this condition. constructed to convey the speaker's affective state either verbally (through the words spo-Finally, the Neutral/Flat condition conveyed no affect at all; thus, the target "emotion" ken), nonverbally (by facial expression and vocal tone), or both verbally and nonverbally. (neutral or "just ok") was portrayed by an absence of emotional expression from verbal Facial and vocal expression (nonverbal information for affect) were either Animated and nonverbal sources. Despite the congruity of verbal and nonverbal expression in the (clearly conveyed happiness, sadness, anger, or surprise) or Flat (face and voice were neu-Neutral/Flat condition, we predicted that it would be most difficult because of the abtral). Words spoken (verbal information for affect) were either Explicit (emotion men-sence of emotion information. Therefore, the predicted order of difficulty among conditions tioned, e.g., "I'm happy that I'm going to the zoo"), Implicit (emotion not mentioned but for persons without autism, from least to most difficult, was Explicit/Animate, Implicit/Aniimplied, e.g., "I got wonderful presents for my birthday"), or Neutral (no emotion men-mate, Explicit/Flat and Neutral/Animate, Implicit/Flat, and Neutral/Flat. tioned or implied, e.g., "I take the bus to school each day"). The combinations of these factors (2 × 3) yielded six conditions with Statistical analysis four trials in each: Explicit/Animate, Explicit/ Flat, Implicit/Animate, Implicit/Flat, Neutral/ The hypotheses of the study were examined by using proportion of correct responses as Animate, Neutral/Flat (see Table 1 ). In each trial, a particular target emotion was depicted, the dependent measure. Repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used either verbally, nonverbally, or both. With the exception of the Neutral/Flat condition, each to conduct pairwise comparisons among the four groups. Analysis of covariance involves condition had one instance of each of angry, happy, sad, and surprised as the target emo-adjusting the dependent variable (outcome measure) for the effect of a covariate variable tion. The Neutral/Flat condition by necessity had four instances of a neutral emotion thought to be related to outcome. Without this adjustment the covariate variable could inflate ("just ok").
The rationale for construction of these the mean square error and make differences in outcome harder to detect. In the case of our stimulus items was that they would vary according to the amount and source of informa-study, the variables chronological age (CA), verbal mental age (VMA), nonverbal mental tion available to specify affect. The Explicit/ Animate and Implicit/Animate conditions age (NVMA), gender (Gender), and performance IQ (PIQ) were considered as potential each contained information about the speaker's affect from two sources (verbal and non-covariates in the ANCOVA model. Because we believed these variables could be related verbal), differing only in the explicitness of to outcome, we wished to test and adjust for the HFC group. NVMA or VMA were found to be significant in some of the comparisons; their possible effects. For this reason, we used ANCOVA.
however, CA, PIQ, and Gender were not significant in any comparison. The backward stepwise selection method was used to identify statistically significant covariates within the model for each between Comparisons of high functioning with lower group comparison. We first included all po-functioning groups tential covariates in the model (CA, VMA, NVMA, Gender, and PIQ). The ANCOVA Because no group differences were found in the HFA/HFC and LFA/LFC comparisons, was run and the least significant covariate (according to the magnitude of the p-value of the we collapsed the four original groups in two for further analysis: High Functioning (HF) coefficient) was dropped, with Group always retained in the model. The model was ad-and Lower Functioning (LF). Repeated measures ANCOVA comparing the HF and LF justed at each step with this procedure until all nonsignificant covariates were dropped groups revealed significant main effects of Group, NVMA, and Animate condition (Taand the final model was arrived at.
Two factors for within-group effects were ble 4). Significant interaction effects were found for Explicit × Group, Animate × considered in the model as repeated measures: Explicit (categories: Explicit, Implicit, Neu-NVMA, Explicit × Animate × NVMA, and Explicit × Animate × Group. The variables tral) and Animate (categories: Animate and Flat). In each analysis the main effects and CA, VMA, Gender, and PIQ were not found to be significant in the model. Follow-up the interactions of the two conditions (Explicit and Animate) with Group and any significant comparisons (Table 5) showed that the HF and LF groups differed significantly (p < covariates in the model were examined. Alpha level was set at .05. An additional analysis .001) in the Implicit/Animate condition and the Neutral/Flat condition, with the HF group examining the relative difficulty of the emotion surprise within and between groups was attaining a higher proportion of correct responses than the LF group in both instances. also carried out, using one-way ANOVAs with follow-up tests (Tukey HSD) for beAdditional follow-up comparisons (t tests) were carried out to examine differences in tween group comparisons and paired t tests for within group comparisons (α level p < performance within each group across different conditions (Table 6 ). Both groups identi-.001).
fied the correct emotion more often in the Animate conditions (where face and voice Results conveyed emotion) than in the Flat conditions (where face and voice did not convey emoMain effects and interactions including those of any significant covariates are given for tion) (HF: t (40) = 7.41, p < .001; LF: t(34) = 9.27, p < .001). Both groups also identified each ANCOVA comparison in Table 3 . Results are consistent in showing that group dif-the correct emotion more often in the Explicit conditions (where the target emotion was ferences were present only for comparisons of HF to LF groups: HFA/LFA; LFA/HFC; named) than in the Implicit conditions (where the emotion was implied but not named) (HF: HFC/LFC; HFA/LFC. By contrast, for the HFA/HFC and the LFA/LFC comparisons, t(40) = 5.03, p < .001; LF: t(34) = 8.25, p < .001). The LF group identified the correct there were no significant main effects or interactions of Group. The three-way interaction emotion significantly more often in the Explicit conditions than in the Neutral condiof Explicit × Animate × Group was statistically significant for the four higher-lower tions (where no emotion was named or verbally implied) (t(34) = 6.03, p < .001), but comparisons only. There was a significant main effect of Animate condition across all there was no significant difference between these conditions for the HF group. Neither pairwise comparisons and of Explicit condition across only those comparisons involving group differed significantly in performance in a Follow-up comparisons from the repeated measures ANCOVA (df = 1, 73) showed the HF and LF groups differed significantly (p < .001) on these two conditions. the Implicit conditions as compared to the tify a speaker with essentially flat affect as neutral or "just ok," was too subtle or confusNeutral conditions.
The relatively good performance of the LF ing for LF participants. Interestingly, further examination of incorrect responses indicated group in the Neutral/Animate Condition (where only nonverbal information for emo-that the majority of responses by LF participants in the Neutral/Flat Condition (44%) tion was present) indicates that these participants were able to use information from the were "happy," whereas only 10% of responses by HF participants in this condition face and voice to identify emotion. However, comparison of performance in the Explicit/ were "happy." Animate and Implicit/Animate conditions Understanding of "surprise" suggests that explicit naming of the emotion was more important to the LF participants, The analysis of differences in the difficulty of the emotion surprise by the four original who performed significantly better in the Explicit/Animate condition (t(34) = 6.32, p < groups revealed a significant main effect of group (F (3, 72) = 4.59, p < .005). Follow-up .001), than it was to the HF participants, who did about equally well in both conditions. In tests showed differences only between the HFC and LFC groups (p < .05) and between fact, the performance of the LF group in the Implicit/Animate Condition was similar to the HFA and LFC groups ( p < .05). When the HF and LF groups were compared, the HF their performance in the Neutral/Animate Condition (where there was no verbal infor-group recognized surprise with significantly greater accuracy than the LF group (HF: mean mation for affect at all), suggesting that they had difficulty inferring emotion that was im-= .610, LF: mean = .390; F(1) = 13.83, p < .0004). An exploratory analysis of withinplied rather than named. By contrast, the HF group readily inferred emotion, performing groups differences in the proportion of correct responses to surprise items compared with significantly better in the Implicit/Animate condition than the Neutral/Animate condition other emotions (happy, sad, angry) in the original four groups revealed that in all but (t(40) = 6.72, p < .001).
Conversely, whereas the HF group per-two cases (surprise versus happy and surprise versus angry for the HFC group), surprise formed significantly better in the Neutral/Flat condition than the Implicit/Flat (t(40) = items were significantly more difficult than other emotion items across the groups (p < −4.98, p < .001), the LF group did not; rather, the LF group performed somewhat better in .01). the Implicit/Flat condition (see Table 6 ). The Discussion large group difference in performance in the Neutral/Flat Condition may indicate that this We tested the hypothesis that persons with an autistic spectrum disorder would be less accucondition, which required the subject to iden-rate than comparison participants in identify-inability to make use of either type of information (Hypothesis 2). However, our results ing the target emotion across all conditions (Hypothesis 1). However, the failure to find do suggest differences among the groups in the relative difficulty of using verbal or nonstatistically significant differences in performance between either the two LF groups or verbal information under various conditions. For the two LF groups, emotion recognition the two HF groups did not support this hypothesis. It is possible that developmental became noticeably more difficult when verbal information was not explicit, as in the Implicit level, rather than the presence or absence of an autistic spectrum disorder, more strongly conditions, or was eliminated, as in the Neutral conditions. Thus, we did not find support determined the ability to identify the target emotion under the conditions presented. This for the hypothesis that implicit verbal expressions of emotion would be differentially more interpretation would be consistent with the findings of other studies showing that devel-difficult for participants with LFA or HFA than for comparison participants (Hypothesis opmental level is an important determinant of success on emotion-recognition tasks and that 3). However, this hypothesis was supported for the LF group compared to the HF group, persons with autism do not necessarily differ from comparison participants on such tasks indicating that participants with lower developmental levels were having more difficulty when verbal mental age is taken into account (e.g., Bormann-Kischkel, 1990; Ozonoff, inferring a speaker's emotion when it was not explicitly named. This finding suggests that Pennington, & Rogers, 1990; Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990) . For instance, Bor-HF participants were better able than the LF to use a particular kind of "cognitive strategy" mann-Kischkel (1990) compared face recognition among children with autism and mental (inferring implied emotion) to help identify emotion. It may also suggest that the LF are retardation. Whereas the participants with mental retardation, with or without autism, less adept than HF participants at interpreting emotion through the nonverbal channel alone had difficulties with the task, HF participants, with or without autism, performed signifi-(as in the Neutral/Animate condition), and so ordinarily rely more on explicit verbal cues. cantly better, leading to the conclusion that the results were not due to autism but to a Another possible interpretation is that in those conditions where verbal and nonverbal inforgeneral developmental delay with respect to emotion recognition. However, because our mation were not congruent (Neutral/Animate, Explicit/Flat, Implicit/Flat), the LF group was results were adjusted for group differences in nonverbal mental age, we cannot be certain at special disadvantage because of an inability to construct an interpretation of the speaker's that level of development per se is the primary factor involved. Instead our results sug-mental state that would resolve the incongruity (e.g., he's angry but he doesn't want to gest that there may be qualitative differences related to affective understanding between our say so) (cf. Gnepp, 1983; Gnepp, McKee, & Domanic, 1987) . In this case, they might rely HF and our LF groups that are not captured by "developmental level" alone.
on explicit verbal information where it is available, as in the Explicit/Flat condition. Our findings indicated that persons in all four of the original groups found it easier to Lower Functioning persons may receive training that predisposes them to look for explicit identify the target emotion when more information rather than less was available to them messages from caregivers and others; alternatively, their poorer performance when affect (i.e., all groups found the task easier when both verbal and nonverbal information for af-is implied, but not made explicit, may reflect difficulty inferences from spoken statements. fect were present). This and other findings suggest that, to varying extents, participants Such a deficit could result from poorer receptive language skills, or from limitations in in all groups were able to make use of both verbal and nonverbal information in recogniz-the ability to reason about the feelings and thoughts of others. The latter alternative could ing emotion. Thus, difficulties in emotion recognition in persons with LFA or mental retar-be viewed as consistent with a theory of mind deficit, although if so, it is present both autisdation are probably not due to a general ing situational variables, what the individual times conflicting combinations of verbal, nonverbal, and contextual information about is asked to judge, and the individual's expectations. We can at best conclude that in this other persons; we know little as yet about how persons with autism integrate and intertask, autistic persons' reliance on verbal versus nonverbal information was similar to that pret complex information of this kind. In order to address these issues it will be necessary of other participants of similar developmental levels.
to adopt methods that employ more complex emotional stimuli, and to evaluate them in Other questions remain. For example, we do not yet have a clear grasp of how autistic contexts that more nearly resemble real situations (Baron-Cohen, 1991) . Further research persons' perception of emotional displays is integrated with their understanding of other should examine in greater detail the component skills involved in interpersonal interacbehaviors involved in the regulation of social interaction, such as communicative gesture, tions, with the aim of determining how persons with autism go about perceiving and body posture, gaze, language pragmatics, intonation, and others. Moreover, in real social acting in a social environment . situations one encounters diverse and some-
